The world outside Rwanda, some of whom did not want to commit troops, money or support, chose not to see it as genocide.

The inaction was a lack of political will of Western world:

• Belgian: panick to action due to fear of loss
  • it was the killing of 10 Belgian peacekeepers, the charges levelled at the Belgians for having been involved in the assassination of Habyramana followed by the rapid decision to withdraw its troops, which set in motion the killing spree.
  • Following the death of their peacekeepers, Belgium and France sent soldiers to rescue their citizens in the days followed. This rapid and succssful mission demonstrated that ==they had the capacity to intervene==. Essentially, most of the Belgian soldiers wanted to continue the mission but were humiliated by government dicision to withdraw.
• France: support of the Rwandan government
  • From 1990 to December 1993, France ==openly supported the regime of Habyarimana against the RPF==, France encouraged the talks leading to the Arusha Accords while at the same time training the Rwandan army and the Interahamwe militia.
  • The policy of the French in supporting the legitimate Hutu-dominated government was to avoid a military victory for the rebel RPF. (==Linda Melvern==)
  • Operation Turquoise,June 1994
  • The French operation certainly saved the lives of many Tutsi as the RPF made its advance. However, the ==French military presence also helped a significant number of Hutu militia and those responsible for the genocide to escape the country==.
  • Paris continued to formally recognize the genocidal interim government for 10 weeks after it had launched the genocide. Both during and after the genocide, France remained unrepentant of its own role and considered itself to be blameless for any aspect of the Rwandan tragedy.
• USA: not taking leading role and hampered the international action, despite having abundant evidence
  • US officials and other international leaders used their influence to actively discourage a strong UN response.
  • The deaths of 18 US soldiers in Somaliain October 1993 shocked the US government and determined offcial reaction to events elsewhere in the region.
  • In January 1994 a new peacekeeping doctrine established rigorous conditions. This was ==Presidential Decree Directive 25 (PDD25)== which was written, in effect, to prevent US forces being used by the UN against US foreign policy interests.
  • In 1998, ==Alan Kuperman== commented: “The US almost single-handedly blocked international action in Rwanda six weeks prior to the genocide, which might have prevented the bloodbath altogether.
  • The ==avoidance of the term “genocide”== was a deliberate policy by the USA and supported by the UK in the UN Security Council.
  • As the RPF advanced and the UNAMIR requested further assistance, US manoeuvres at the Security Council repeatedly undermined all attempts to strengthen the UN military presence in Rwanda. In the end, not a single additional soldier or piece of military hardware reached the country before the genocide ended.
  • The US role in the Rwandan genocide demonstrates at least ==three reasons for the USA’s lack of action==: first, what had happened in Somalia; second, the absence of any real national or economic interest in Rwanda; and, fnally, political pressure domestically. The congressional elections coming up in November were more important to some White House aides than what was happening in Rwanda.